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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Respondent to recover money 
on a contract for services allegedly performed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court granted Respondent's iftotion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Appellants' motion to Amend their Answer, 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the Lower Court's order 
granting Respondent's motion for Summary Judgment as well as 
a reversal of the Lower Court's denial of Appellants' motion to 
amend their Answer. Appellants further seek a remand of this 
action to the Lower Court with instructions to grant Appellants 
leave to amend their Answer and/or to grant Appellants a trial 
on the merits of the issues raised in their Answer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 1, 1972, Respondent and Appellants entered into 
an "Agreement" [hereinafter referred to as the Agreement] (Record 
pp. 3-4) whereby Appellants agreed to deed all of their right, 
title and interest in a certain Reber property to Respondent in 
exchange for Respondent's arranging for the "annexation" or 
"transaction" of a certain 890 acres of land [hereinafter referred 
to as the Johnson land] "into" the City of Ivins in order that 
the Johnson land would be able to obtain a source of water for 
residential development. This Agreement was amended by an "Adden-
dum" [hereinafter referred to as the Addendum] (Record p. 5) dated 
September 6, 19 72. The Addendum provided that, instead of trans-
ferring their interests in the Reber property to Respondent, Ap-
pellants would pay Respondent $15,000.00 within fourteen days after 
the "annexation" of the aforesaid Johnson land "into" the City of 
Ivins. Neither the Agreement nor the Addendum contained integration 
clauses. 
Subsequently Appellants and the City of Ivins negotiated 
afPre-Incorporation Agreement" [hereinafter referred to as the 
Pre-Incorporation Agreement]. Negotiation and performance of this 
Pre-Incorporation Agreement were seen by Appellants as being 
conditions precedent to the "annexation" of the Johnson land to 
the City of Ivins because the Pre-Incorporation Agreement contained 
certain conditions and covenants providing for a supply of water 
to the Johnson land for developmental purposes. (Record p. 7). 
Performance of the covenants and conditions under this Pre-Incor-
poration Agreement, however, was never completed. (Record p. 7). 
Nevertheless the City of Ivins passed a resolution purporting to 
annex the Johnson land. Appellants, of course, acquiesced in 
this resolution only to the extent that their purpose in seeking 
"annexation/1 i.e. obtaining a water supply, had been or would be 
achieved. 
Respondent, believing that the action taken by the City 
of Ivins was sufficient to constitute an "annexation" within 
vii 
the meaning of the Agreement and Addendum, brought the instant 
action to recover the $15,000.00 which he felt was due and owing 
him from Appellants. Appellants, on the other hand, denied in 
their Answer that "annexation" had occurred, noting that the parties 
to the Agreement and Addendum intended that "annexation" be con-
tingent on the City of Ivins1 performance of those Pre-Incorpor-
ation covenants and conditions pertaining to the delivery of a 
water supply to the Johnson land. (Record p. 7). 
vii 
ARGUMENT I: ON HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RESPONDENT 
FAILED TO SHOW THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO A 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be 
rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, ansv/ers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on filed, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." 
A* Genuine Issues of Material Fact. 
The primary factual dispute in the present case is: What 
did Respondent and Appellants mean by their use of the term 
"annexation" in the Agreement and Addendum? More specifically — 
did Respondent and Appellants intend, as Appellant argues, that the 
term "annexation" would include an arrangement for a supply of 
water adequate to facilitate development of the Johnson land as 
stated in the Pre-Incorporation Agreement? If so, was this arrange-
ment performed when Appellants negotiated their Pre-Incorporation 
Agreement with the City of Ivins, or did performance of this 
arrangement remain dependent upon the City of Ivins1 de facto 
delivery of a water supply for developmental purposes to the 
Johnson land? If arrangement for a water supply was not seen by 
1 
Respondent and Appellants as being an integral element of 
"annexation/1 was "annexation" of the Johnson land to the City 
of Ivins accomplished in any other sense? More specifically — 
was actual performance of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement oetween 
Appellants and the City of Ivins regarded by Respondent and 
Appellants as a condition precedent to "annexation?" And without 
actual performance of the Pre-Incorporation Agreement — was 
"annexation" accomplished even according to the most narrowly 
technical legal meaning which can be assigned to that term? 
It is clear that Respondent's and Appellants1 pleadings 
place in dispute the various answers which can be given to the 
questions of what was meant by annexation and whether or not 
annexation has actually occurred. Thus, genuine issues of 
material fact were raised in the Lower Court, the resolution of 
which was not amenable to summary judgment procedure. 
In addition to the Respondent's and Appellants1 pleadings, 
however, Respondent submitted, in conjunction with his motion for 
summary judgment, two affidavits to show the non-existence of any 
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the "annexation" 
of the Johnson land. These affidavits, however, fall short of 
making this necessary showing. 
First, neither affidavit speaks to the critical issue of 
Respondent's and Appellants' contractual intent relative to their 
use of the term "annexation." The factual question as to whether 
the parties intended that the term "annexation" would include some 
sort of arrangement for a water supply to the Johnson land remains 
7 
unaffected by the conclusory opinions expressed in these affi-
davits that "annexation" has occurred. Thus Respondent's affi-
davits suggest that an "annexation" of some sort may have been 
accomplished, but they do not suggest that "annexation/1 as that 
term was or may have been interpreted by Respondent and Appellants 
themselves, has been accomplished. Nor do these affidavits suggest 
that any arrangement for a water supply to the Johnson land, as 
intimated in the affirmative defense raised in Appellants' answer, 
was not an integral part of the "annexation" Agreement. 
Ordinarily the purpose of a summary judgment procedure is 
to pierce pleadings and to assess the proof of the parties in 
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. And, 
therefore, ordinarily where affidavits are submitted in support 
of a party's motion for summary judgment "an adverse party may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." U.R.C.P. 56(e). 
However, as indicated above, "where the evidentiary matter 
in support of the motion [for summary judgment] does not establish 
the absence of a genuine issue [of material fact], summary judg-
ment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is 
presented." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, for example, "where an 
issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation 
of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility, 
3 
summary judgment is not appropriate." Advisory Committee's Notes 
on Amendments in 1963 to FED, R. CIV. P. 56(e), found in Cound, 
Friedenthal and Miller, 19 74 Civil Procedure Supplement 158 (1974). 
And in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970) 
the United States Supreme Court noted that: 
[p]ointing to PvUle 56(e), as amended in 1963, 
Respondent argues that it was incumbent on 
Petitioner to come forward with an affidavit 
properly asserting the presence of [facts] 
. . . to avoid summary judgment. Respondent 
notes in this regard that none of the materials 
upon which Petitioner relied met the requirements 
of Rule 56(e). This argument does not withstand 
scrutiny, however, for both the commentary on and 
background of the 19 6 3 amendment conclusively 
show that it was not intended to modify the burden 
of the moving party under Rule 56(c) to show in-
itially the absence of a genuine issue concerning 
any material facts. The advisory committee note 
on the amendment states that the changes were not 
designed to 'affect the ordinary standards appli-
cable to the summary judgment.' And, in a comment 
directed specifically to a contention like Respon-
dent's, the committee stated that 'where the 
evidentiary matter in support of the motion does 
not establish the absence of a genuine issue, 
summary judgment must be denied even if no oppos-
ing evidentiary matter is presented.' Because 
Respondent did not meet its initial burden of 
establishing [facts that would justify summary 
judgment] . . . Petitioner here was not required 
to come forward with suitable opposing affidavits. 
Not only do Respondent's affidavits fail to address the issue of 
contractual intent involved here — but also, the entire intent 
problem, especially where oral understandings between the parties 
may be concerned, seems irresolvable without some opportunity for 
a trier of fact to observe "the demeanor of witnesses in order to 
evaluate their credibility." For these reasons Respondent failed, 
through the use of affidavits on his motion for summary judgment, 
4 
to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, 
and Appellants were, therefore, under no obligation to support 
the allegations and denials of their Answer by counter-affidavit 
or otherwise. 
Second, Respondent's affidavits did not establish the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the 
"annexation11 controversy because they were insufficient to prove 
that an "annexation," even in the most narrowly technical legal 
sense, occurred. 
Looking, for instance, to the affidavit of Rodney T. 
Ence, a councilman in the City of Ivins — Mr. Ence states 
essentially that (a) the City of Ivins town council "approved 
the Johnson addition" and annexed said Johnson addition to the 
City of Ivins, and that (b) the annexation plat was reported 
with the Washington County Recorder. 
It is clear, however, that a legally binding annexation 
in Utah requires much more than ad hoc resolutions and the record-
ing of an annexation plat. Utah Code Annotated, §10-3-1 (1953) 
provides, inter alia, that persons desiring annexation must file 
a petition in the office of the Recorder or town Clerk of the 
city or town to which annexation is desired, and that said petition 
must be signed by a majority of the real property'owners and by 
the owners of not less than one-third in value of the real property 
which it is desired to annex. Furthermore, §10-3-1 requires that 
"an ordinance shall be passed, declaring the annexation," and that | 
i 
i 
5 ! 
a "certified copy of the ordinance declaring such annexation 
. • . shall . . . be filed in the office of the County Recorder," 
It does not appear from the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence whether 
these statutory conditions to annexation have been satisfied. 
This Court has expressly stated that these statutory conditions 
are not mere technicalities; they are "absolute requirement[s]." 
Peterson v. Bountiful City, 25 Utah 2d 126, 477 P.2d 153 (1970). 
See, for instance, Jensen v. Bountiful City, 20 Utah 2d 159, 435 
P.2d 284 (1967) (annexation declared void because a majority of 
property owners not represented on annexation petition); and 
Johnson v. Sandy City Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 22, 497 P.2d 644 
(1972) (annexation declared void because certified copy of the 
ordinance declaring annexation had not been filed with County 
Recorder's office within a reasonable time). Mr. Ence's failure 
to include in his affidavit a statement to the effect that all 
of these "absolute requirements" for annexation have been met 
could in no way create a basis in the record alone for the trial 
court to conclude that they had been met. 
This initial presumption against the sufficiency of Mr. 
Ence's affidavit to show that an annexation of the Johnson land 
to the City of Ivins had, in fact, occurred becomes almost irre-
buttable in light of the additional facts that Appellants' 
petition for annexation was conditioned on acceptance and per-
formance by the City of Ivins of Appellants' Pre-Incorporation 
Agreement; that said Pre-Incorporation Agreement was never per-
formed by the City of Ivins; and that since majority property 
owner support for annexation was conditioned on performance 
by the City of Ivins of Appellants' Pre-Incorporation Agreement, 
failure to perform said Pre-Incorporation Agreement by the City 
of Ivins effected a withdrawal of majority property owner support 
for the proposed annexation, thus rendering the City of Ivins 
annexation resolution null and void. Jensen v. Bountiful City, 
supra; see also Peterson v. Bountiful City, supra. The establish-
ing of conditions precedent to annexation in such Pre-Incorporation 
Agreements is a procedure specifically approved by this Court* 
Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972). The 
fact that these conditions precedent have not been met by either 
Appellants or the City of Ivins suggests that annexation, as the 
Respondent defines that term, has not occurred. 
The affidavit of Floyd Rnce, Respondent in the present 
case, adds nothing to the affidavit of his son, Rodney T. Ence, 
which has just been discussed. Indeed Respondent's affidavit 
states in highly conclusory fashion that the Johnson land "was 
annexed to the City of Ivins" on or about August 9, 19 73. This 
statement suffers from the same defects as those found in the 
affidavit of Rodney T. Ence; viz. it is inadequate to demonstrate 
substantial compliance by the City of Ivins with the statutory 
requirements for annexation. Additionally it would appear that, 
if it is Respondent's purpose to prove by affidavit that annexation 
occurred in a narrowly technical, legal sense, irrespective of any 
supplementary meanings which Respondent and Appellants may have 
attached to said term — then the question of whether annexation 
occurred would be a question of "ultimate fact" and Respondent's 
conclusory opinion, set forth in his affidavit, that the Johnson 
land "was annexed" is inadmissable for a trial purpose, and hence 
for summary judgment purposes. See U.R.C.P. 56(e); Walker v, 
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 
538 (1973) ; and Western States Thrift and Loan Company v. Blomquist, 
29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972). 
Because Respondent's affidavits do not speak to the 
relevant factual dispute involved in the present case, i.e., the 
issue of contractual intent with respect to the term "annexation;" 
and even if we accept Respondent's interpretation of the relevant 
factual dispute in the present case, i.e., whether "annexation" 
occurred in a narrow legal sense, because Respondent's affidavits 
are insufficient to prove his own version of that factual dispute 
due to their incomplete character and due to their character as 
opinion testimony, Respondent has failed to meet his burden of 
showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, and, 
therefore, summary judgment was improperly granted in the Lower 
Court in Respondent's favor. 
Third, the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence submitted in support 
of Respondent's motion for summary judgment cannot assist him in 
sustaining his burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue 
of material fact for one final reason: Said affidavit was not 
properly served upon Appellants. U.R.C.P. 6(d) provides that 
"when a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be 
served with the motion . . . " U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that a 
motion for summarv iiiflampnf "qhnl 1 ho ar>r-xrorl nf i^no4- in /*«»,« 
before the time fixed for the hearing," The Record reveals that 
Rodney T. Ence's affidavit was prepared on October 15, 1975 while 
the hearing on Respondent's motion for summary judgment took place 
on October 15, 19 75. Thus there is no conceivable way in which 
Appellants could have received the requisite ten day notice. 
Appellants did not consent to this untimely service. Even 
if it had been necessary for Appellants to prepare counter-affida-
vits in response to the affidavit of Rodney T. Ence, Appellants 
obviously were given insufficient notice and time under U.R.C.P. 
6(d) and 56(c) to prepare such a response. And thus even if the 
affidavit of Rodney T. Ence can be said to have contradicted the 
allegations or denials of Appellants' Answer, because of Respondent's 
failure to abide by the mandates of U.R.C.P. 6(d) and 56(c), said 
affidavit was improperly considered by the Lower Court in passing on 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. 
B. Appellants are not precluded as a matter of law from introducing 
parol evidence to show the intent of Respondent and Appellants 
relative to their use of the term "annexation" in the Agreement 
and Addendum. 
From the preceding argument it can be seen that genuine 
issues of material fact exist in the present case. These issues 
of material fact must be resolved by a trier of fact unless 
Appellants are barred as a matter of law from proving their factual 
version of what Respondent and Appellants meant by their use of 
the term "annexation" in the Agreement and Addendum. The only 
potential bar to the introduction of this proof is the parol 
evidence rule. 
There are two basic reasons why the parol evidence rule 
does not bar the admission of evidence extrinsic to the Agreement 
"annexation." 
First, the parol evidence rule applies only to integrated 
agreements. Whether the Agreement and Addendum involved in the 
present case were integrated agreements is a question of material 
fact and, therefore, irresolvable on a motion for summary judgment. 
Furthermore, under any theory of fact interpretation, the Agree-
ment and Addendum involved in the present case were not integrated 
agreements. 
The parol evidence rule is defined by the Restatement, 
Contracts, §237, as follows: 
. . . the integration of an agreement makes inopera-
tive to add to or to vary the agreement all con-
temporaneous oral agreements relating to the same 
subject matter; and also, unless the integration 
is void, or voidable and avoided, all prior oral 
or written agreements relating thereto. If either 
void or voidable and avoided, the integration 
leaves the operation of prior agreements unaffected. 
Thus, invocation of the parol evidence rule is contingent upon the 
existence of an "integrated agreement." If no "integrated agree-
ment" exists, then the parol evidence rule cannot serve to bar the 
introduction of evidence extrinsic to the contractual writing in 
question. 
Restatement, Contracts, §228, defines "integrated agree-
ment" as a situation where " . . . the parties thereto adopt a 
writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the 
agreement. An integration is the writing or writings so adopted." 
The test to be applied in determining whether an "integrated 
agreement" exists — according to the Restatement Comment — is: 
. . . that the parties shall have manifested assent 
not merely to the provisions of their agreement, but 
to the writing or writings in question as a final 
statement of their intentions as to the matters con-
tained therein. 
This Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 2 8 Utah 2d 
261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972) after expressly approving the Restatement 
version of the parol evidence rule outlined above, went on to 
state that: 
Whenever a litigant insists that a writing 
that is before the Court is an integration and 
asks the application of the parol evidence rule, 
the Court must determine as a question of fact 
whether the parties did in fact adopt a particular 
writing or writings as the final and complete ex-
pression of their bargain. In determining the 
issue of the completeness of the integration in 
writing, evidence extrinsic to the writing itself 
is admissable. Parol testimony is admissable to 
show the circumstances under which the agreement 
was made and the purpose for which the instrument 
was executed . . . Whether a document was or was 
not adopted as an integration may be proved by any 
relevant evidence. 
Thus the question of integration is itself a question of 
material fact and is, therefore, not amenable to resolution on a 
motion for summary judgment. Moreover — under any conceivable 
theory of fact interpretation, the Agreement and Addendum involved 
in the present case were not integrated agreements. This can be 
seen by comparing the facts of the present case with the fact 
situation found in a similar case, Security Leasing Company v. 
Flinco, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461 P.2d 460 (1969). There Defendant 
Flinco had leased a computer and tab card punch control from 
Plaintiff Lessor. Four separate documents executed intermittently 
over a twelve-month period governed this transaction. A completion 
certificate was signed by both parties providing that: 
[a]11 installations or other work necessary to 
the use thereof have been completed; that said 
chattels have been examined and/or tested and 
are in good operating order or condition/ and 
are in all respects satisfactory to undersigned 
and as represented, and that said chattels have 
been accepted by undersigned for the purpose of 
said equipment lease. 
Subsequently, Flinco became dissatisfied with the equipment per-
formance and stopped payment. Plaintiffs instituted an action to 
recover on the leasing contract. Flinco defended on the basis 
of justifiable rescission — that the equipment did not perform 
in accordance with the parties1 agreement. This agreement, accord-
ing to Flinco, included an oral promise to program the computer 
so that it would operate effectively for purposes of Defendant's 
business. In upholding the trial judge's allowance of parol 
evidence to establish the contents of this oral agreement, 
Justice Crockett wrote: 
The foundation which must be established 
before the [parol evidence] rule has application 
is that there is in fact a contract in writing which 
represents the complete agreement between the 
parties. Where the circumstances are such that 
it is evident that the writing does not cover 
some essential aspect of the transaction, outside 
evidence may be resorted to determine what was to 
be done about it. Inasmuch as the method of opera-
tion of this computer is such that it could not perform 
the intended service for Flinco unless it was pro-
gramed into the latter's business, and the documents 
referred to do not spell out what was to be done about 
that aspect of the service, it was not only permis-
sable, but necessary that the trial court receive and 
consider other evidence to resolve the dispute be-
tween the parties as to whether the documents re-
presented their complete agreement. 
Applying the Flinco court's rationale to the facts of the instant 
case — what could be a more "essential aspect" of developing 
property than a water supply? It seems manifestly unreasonable 
to Appellants that a developer would pay $15f000.00 for a purely 
formal "annexation" without some understanding that the customary, 
and in this case specific, purpose for obtaining annexation, i.e., 
the acquisition of such a water supply, would be likewise achieved. 
For these reasons it appears dubious that the Agreement and 
Addendum involved in the present case were seen by the Respondent 
and Appellants as being "integrated" writings. 
Second, even if the Agreement and Addendum did constitute 
a "integrated" contract between Respondent and Appellants, the 
parol evidence rule is inapplicable here because the term 
"annexation" is inherently ambiguous. Nowhere within the four 
corners of the Agreement and Addendum does a definition of the 
term "annexation" appear. Likewise nowhere within the four 
corners of the Agreement and Addendum is any indication given as 
to what the term "annexation" might mean. In the absence of any 
attempt by Respondent and Appellants themselves to make this term's 
meaning explicit, and given the multifarious meanings which con-
ceivably can be assigned to this term, it is apparent that some 
evidence extrinsic to the Agreement and Addendum must be introduced 
to enable a trier of fact to ascertain the intended meaning of 
"annexation." See Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewart, 4 
Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 (1955); Continental Bank & Trust Company v. 
Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 (1957); Dayton v. Gibbons and 
Reed Company, 12 Utah 2d 296, 365 P.2d 801 (1961); and Builough v. 
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965). 
Because the Agreement and Addendum involved in the present 
case were not integrated contractual writings and because, even 
if they were, the term "annexation11 contained therein is inher-
ently ambiguous, the parol evidence rule is inapplicable to said 
Agreement and Addendum and Appellants are not precluded as a matter 
of law from introducing parol evidence to show the intent of the 
parties relative to their use of the term "annexation" in said 
Agreement and Addendum, 
ARGUMENT 2: THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS1 MOTION TO AMEND THEIR ANSWER. 
Appellants1 contend that the Lower Court's abuse of dis-
cretion here consisted of its entering an order granting summary 
judgment in Respondent's favor when the more appropriate and 
equitable alternative of allowing Appellants' to amend their 
Answer existed. Even if it is conceded that Appellants1 Answer was 
defective in that it failed to put issues of material fact into 
dispute between the parties — the Lower Court's awareness that 
Appellants had attempted to accomplish this purpose in drafting 
their Answer and its awareness that Appellants, if given a reason-
able opportunity, could have plead defenses of oral collateral 
agreement, reformation or failure of consideration with greater 
specificity so as to put issues of material fact into dispute 
between the parties, thus making summary judgment inappropriate, 
required the Lower Court to grant Appellants' Motion to Amend 
their Answer. To suggest otherwise would be to exalt the virtue 
of technically adequate pleadings over the policy of affording 
parties to a lawsuit every reasonable opportunity of having their 
claims litigated on the merits. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Utah case law both display a decided preference for this policy 
of giving a party to a lawsuit his day in court. 
U.R.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings 
"shall be freely given when justice so requires." And commentators 
have recognized that "the entire spirit of the rules is to the 
effect that controversies shall be decided on the merits/1 and 
that "the courts have not been hesitant to allow amendments for 
the purpose of presenting the real issues of the case, where the 
moving party has not been guilty of bad faith. . . . the opposing 
party will not be unduly prejudiced and the trial of the issues 
will not be unduly delayed." 3 Moored Federal Practice 1115.08 [2] 
at 873-875 (1974). The Supreme Court of the United States has 
stated that: 
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend 'shall 
be freely given when justice so requires;1 this mandate 
is to be heeded. . . if the underlying facts or cir-
cumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper 
subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity 
to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any 
apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad 
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility 
of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the 
rules require, be 'freely given.1 Of course, the grant 
or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the 
discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal 
to grant the leave without any justifying reason appear-
ing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it 
is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with 
the spirit of the Federal RHIPQ 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
In recognizing and applying these principles the Utah 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the possibility of 
undue delay or prejudice to an opposing party is proportionately 
less in situations where no trial date has been set or where 
discovery processes have not commenced. For this reason motions 
for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend are generally 
discountenanced in Utah. See, for example, Consolidated Steelcraft 
v. Knowlton, 114 Utah 368, 199 P. 2d 149 (1948). And even where, 
as in Harman v. Yeagar, 100 Utah 30, 110 P. 2d 352 (1941), a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings is in effect a "speaking 
demurrer," the equivalent of our modern day summary judgment 
procedure, the Court must construe the challenged pleading liberally 
"with all reasonable inferences from the facts pleaded indulged 
with a view to a trial on the merits and doing substantial justice 
between the parties." Or, if the challenged pleading is technically 
insufficient, but there exists a "reasonable probability that . 
[the pleader] could state a defense or make an issue on a matter 
material to Plaintiff's cause of action," the Court must allow 
an amendment to the otherwise defective pleading in order to 
guarantee a full hearing on the merits of the entire controversy. 
See Hancock v. Luke 46 Utah 26, 148 P. 452 (1915); Detroit Vapor 
Stove Co. v. J. C. Weeter Lumber Co., 61 Utah 503, 215 P. 995 
(1923); Johnston v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P. 2d 1132 (1936); 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 
P. 2d 919 (1943); and Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P. 
2d 1045 (1971). Naturally, therefore, because a "court cannot 
ordinarily know that other facts to make the pleading good cannot 
be pleaded . . . a refusal to permit pleading over where it does 
not appear positive that no cause of action or defense can be 
pleaded may run easily into an abuse of discretion." Provo City 
v. Claudin, 63 P. 2d 570 (Utah, 1936). This is especially true 
where the objection to a pleading goes to the form rather than 
to the substance of that pleading; that isfwhere, because of 
ambiguity, a pleading is technically deficient, "but where a good 
defense might be pleaded the Court should not grant a judgment on 
the pleadings where leave is asked to amend but should allow the 
amendments to be made." Consolidated Steelcraft v. Knowlton, 
supra. Even where a case is actually ripe for summary judgment, 
or where, a summary judgment has been, in fact, granted, a motion 
to amend pleadings will be denied only where the proffered amend-
ment (a) would advance no new defense theories, (b) would not 
contradict or explain the materials employed by Plaintiff in 
support of his motion for summary judgment or (c) would not 
effect a substantial change in the issues as they were formulated 
in the original pleadings. See Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 
351 P. 2d 624 (1960). Thus if the trial court is aware of facts 
or grounds upon which new defense theories might be advanced or 
by reason of which the materials employed by a movant in support 
of his motion for summary judgment might be explained or contra-
dicted so as to raise a genuine issue of material fact, it would 
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be inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment 
instead of "freely giving" the opposing party an opportunity to 
amend his pleading and have a hearing on the merits of his claims. 
See Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1972). And 
thus where "the entire record reveals facts susceptible of 
inferences that would justify an amendment of the pleadings and 
save the action, a motion for summary judgment should not be 
granted, but the party against whom the motion is directed should 
be afforded an opportunity to amend his faulty pleading." Castner 
V. First National Bank of Anchorage, 278 F. 2d 376f 384 (9th Cir. 
1960) . 
Applying these principles of law to the facts of the instant 
case it is readily apparent that the kower Court's order granting 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment here was tantamount to 
a "judgment on the pleadings." No trial date had been set and 
not a single discovery devi e had been employed by either party. 
The only documents on record for the Lower Court to examine in 
making its decision to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment 
were the Respondent's Complaint, the Appellants' Answer and two 
rather inconclusive affidavits—one served on the morning of argument. 
Thus a strong presumption against disallowance of a motion to 
amend under these circumstances should have restrained the lower 
Court from denying Appellants' motion to amend. With nothing more 
than essentially the pleadings to look to in making its deter-
mination whether to grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment 
the trial Court, even if it found some technical deficiency in 
Appellants' Answer, should have asked whether there was a "reason-
able probability" that Appellants could "state a defense or make 
an issue on a matter material to Plaintiff's cause of action," 
Clearly such a reasonable probability existed. Appellants' Answer 
not only expressly denies the existence of any "annexation" 
within the meaning of the Agreement and Addendum, but also the 
affirmative defense contained in that Answer that the City of 
Ivins had breached its Pre-Incorporation Agreement suggests that 
Respondent and Appellant had radically different understandings 
and intentions with respect to the meaning of the term "annexation. 
Furthermore the Lower Court was aware of the possibility that 
these various oral or written collateral understandings or 
agreements existed because it allowed Appellants "to argue 
matters that were outside the pleadings" (Record p. 2 3)• 
at the October 15th hearing on Respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. This awareness—under the tests examined above—made 
it incumbent on the Lower Court to grant Appellants' motion to 
amend their Answer. For these reasons Appellants contend that 
the lower Court abused its discretion in denying Appellants' motion 
to amend their Answer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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